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Midcentury targets have been proposed as a guide to climate
change policy that can link long-term goals to shorter-term actions.
However no explicit mitigation analyses have been carried out of
the relationship between midcentury conditions and longer-term
outcomes. Here we use an integrated assessment modeling frame-
work with a detailed representation of the energy sector to exam-
ine the dependence of climate change outcomes in 2100 on
emissions levels, atmospheric concentrations, and technology char-
acteristics in 2050. We find that midcentury conditions are crucial
determinants of longer-term climate outcomes, and we identify
feasibility thresholds describing conditions that must be met by
midcentury to keep particular long-term options open. For exam-
ple, to preserve the technical feasibility of a 50% likelihood of
keeping global average temperature at <2 °C above preindustrial
in 2100, global emissions must be reduced by about 20% below
2000 levels by 2050. Results are sensitive to several assumptions,
including the nature of future socio-economic development. In a
scenario with high demand for energy and land, being below 2 °C
with 50% likelihood requires a 50% reduction in emissions below
2000 levels by 2050, which is only barely feasible with known tech-
nologies in that scenario. Results suggest that a greater focus on
midcentury targets could facilitate the development of policies
that preserve potentially desirable long-term options.
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The ultimate goal of international climate change policy asstated in Article 2 of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change is to “avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.” This goal has motivated a wide array of ana-
lyses of potentially dangerous climate change impacts and of mit-
igation strategies that might limit greenhouse gas concentrations
or global average temperature increases. Political attention has
increasingly focused on limiting warming to 2° C, reflected most
recently in the acknowledgment by the Copenhagen Accord (1) of
the scientific basis for such a limit. However a firm international
agreement on a long-term climate policy target has yet to be
achieved. At the same time, growing emissions of greenhouse
gases continue to increase the amount of climate change to which
we are committed (2). Over the next few decades, these growing
emissions may make some potentially desirable long-term goals
unattainable (3).
Interim climate policy targets for the midcentury have been
proposed as a guide to designing policies affecting emissions over
the next several decades. Rationales for interim targets include
preserving a range of options for the eventual choice of long-term
goal (4), providing more guidance to policy decisions on emis-
sions paths over the next few decades than long-term goals alone
would provide (5), and providing clearer policy signals to deci-
sion-makers with multidecade planning horizons.
Policy proposals that include midcentury goals have already
begun to appear. The G8 has advocated a goal of reducing global
emissions by at least 50% by 2050 (6). Several business commu-
nities (7, 8) as well as governments have suggested or adopted
emissions targets for 2050, including Germany, Australia, the
UK, and the state of California. The European Commission
has stated that reductions of global greenhouse gases of up to
50% below 1990 levels by 2050 would be consistent with the EU
position that long-term warming should be limited to 2 °C above
preindustrial (9), and legislative proposals in the US would imply
reducing US emissions to 15–80% below 2000 levels by 2050 (10).
In the scientific literature, the importance of midcentury con-
ditions has also been recognized, regarding emissions (11–15),
radiative forcing (16), technology (17, 18), or the climate conse-
quences of idealized emissions paths (19). Working Group 3 of
the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report summarized relationships
between emissions levels in 2050 and long-term climate change
outcomes in scenarios (20), although these scenarios did not
explicitly consider interim targets. More generally, decision ana-
lyses have illustrated how optimal emissions reduction strategies
under uncertainty are affected when there is an opportunity to
adjust decisions over time (21), sometimes including the possibi-
lity that achieving long-term goals may become infeasible (22).
Such analyses have been carried out with relatively simple models
employing stylized definitions of infeasibility.
We build on this previous work by carrying out the first explicit
analysis of the relationship between midcentury targets and long-
term outcomes using a model of the global energy system with
detailed technological representation. Explicit analysis of interim
targets is valuable because it directly incorporates uncertainty in
long-term goals and their attainability given shorter-term mitiga-
tion. Our conclusions about the implications of midcentury con-
ditions differ therefore from traditional stabilization scenarios
driven only by long-term goals. Use of an energy technology
model that can represent inertia and path dependency in energy
systems is also important, because the feasibility of long-term
climate goals is determined to a large extent by the flexibility
of the energy system at midcentury, a characteristic best assessed
with models that represent factors such as rates of capital stock
turnover, limits to market penetration rates of particular technol-
ogies, and relationships between production and distribution
systems.
Methodology
In this study we employ the IIASA integrated assessment model-
ing framework (23), including the global, 11-region MESSAGE
model that accounts for all greenhouse gas emissions (24) and
has a detailed, technology-specific energy sector for the explicit
representation of path dependency and inertia. To limit the num-
ber of model runs, we assess a set of individual scenarios rather
than performing an optimization under uncertainty, and we limit
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the analysis to two independent time periods using a myopic ver-
sion of the model (25). In each individual scenario, demand is met
over the first-half of the century to achieve a specified target in
2050 without knowing what the long-term goal will turn out to be
(or, for that matter, what energy demand, technology costs, or any
other aspect of the future beyond 2050 will be). In 2050, the long-
term goal is learned, and demand over the second half of the cen-
tury is met to reach this goal. While having no knowledge of long-
term goals and conditions until 2050 and only one opportunity to
adjust the initial mitigation strategy are both simplifications of
reality, they are improvements over more typical assumptions
of perfect foresight and no adjustments to strategy (20). We assess
the trade-off between mitigation costs and the risk of exceeding
various long-term goals as a function of the midcentury target.
Long-term goals are defined as concentrations or temperature
change in 2100, and we model temperature change outcomes
probabilistically (26, 27). Althought climate consequences be-
yond 2100 are important (19), our main focus is on technology-
specific modeling of plausible mitigation paths, an approach best
suited to timescales of decades, not centuries. We investigate
midcentury targets expressed in terms of emissions, concentra-
tions, and the share of energy from zero-carbon sources. Among
other outcomes, we quantify how achieving particular medium-
term targets can influence the probability of staying below
specific temperature increases at the end of the century, and
we identify critical midcentury thresholds that, if surpassed,
would make achieving particular long-term goals infeasible within
our modeling framework. Infeasible is defined here as not pos-
sible to achieve with technologies that are currently at least in
early demonstration or commercialization phase, which includes
a wide range of renewables, nuclear, and efficiency improvements
but excludes, for example, nuclear fusion and geo-engineering.
Further details on methodology are provided in SI Text, and main
results for the emissions scenarios and probabilistic climate mod-
eling can be found at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~riahi/Interim_
Targets.
Results
The development of emissions and concentrations for the full set
of scenarios we analyze is shown in Fig. 1. To account for uncer-
tainty in development pathways, we use two different baseline
scenarios, recent implementations of the IPCC B2 and A2r
scenarios (23, see also SI Text). We impose a wide range of mid-
century targets, from <1∕2 to more than a doubling of emissions
by 2050, compared to 2000. From these midcentury targets we
have explored the attainability and costs for a range of concen-
tration targets in 2100 ranging from <450 ppm to >1; 000 ppm
CO2-eq. By doing so we allow for scenarios that temporarily
overshoot the target during the century.
Fig. 2 summarizes results for all feasible combinations of
midcentury and end-of-century targets. The first row of panels
shows the relationship between total energy system costs over
the century and midcentury CO2 emissions levels (including
emissions from energy, industry, and land-use change), for each
end-of-century equivalent CO2 concentration goal. The second
row of panels is similar, but shows results with midcentury
conditions expressed in terms of shares of global primary energy
from zero-carbon sources, rather than in terms of emissions.
Additional figures with midcentury conditions expressed as atmo-
spheric concentrations are provided in SI Text.
There are two key features of these results. The first is that for
each long-term goal, there is a range of midcentury emissions, or
of the zero-carbon energy share, that minimizes total costs. For
example, considering the long-term goal of 550 ppm equivalent
CO2 concentration in 2100 and assuming the B2 baseline scenar-
io, energy system costs over the century are minimized if CO2
emissions in 2050 are between 7 and 10 GtC/yr (as compared
to about 8.3 GtC emitted in 2000), or if zero-carbon shares
are between 52% and 58% (as compared to about 25% in
2000). If conditions in 2050 are outside these ranges, costs rise
substantially. Comparing the Left and Right panels of Fig. 2 also
clearly illustrates the impact of the baseline-specific technological
and socio-economic assumptions. Similar midterm conditions do
not guarantee similar costs for a given long-term target, nor are
the cost-minimizing midterm conditions necessarily the same for
both of the baselines.
At first sight Fig. 2 might seem at odds with typical mitigation
cost curves, in which costs rise monotonically with increasing
emissions reductions. However, the u-shaped cost curve is simply
a consequence of expressing total costs over the whole century as
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Fig. 1. Emissions and CO2-eq. concentration pathways to 2050 and resulting attainability ranges for the long-term (2100), assuming the B2 (Left) or A2r (Right)
reference scenarios. Emissions include CO2 from fossil fuel burning and land-use change. Colored shaded areas depict the feasible range of outcomes over the
second half of the century associated with each 2050 emissions target.
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a function of midcentury conditions. Costs over the first half of
the century do indeed rise monotonically as the midcentury target
becomes more stringent. In contrast, for any given end-of-century
target, costs over the second half of the century decrease for more
stringent midcentury targets. Thus, total costs depend on the bal-
ance between first-half and second-half mitigation costs, resulting
in a particular emissions level or zero-carbon energy share in 2050
that minimizes their sum.
The existence of cost-minimizing midcentury conditions holds
for both baseline scenarios and all long-term targets considered,
suggesting that midcentury targets could be used as a means of
minimizing costs of achieving uncertain long-term goals. Results
in Fig. 2 cannot be translated directly into desirable midcentury
goals if the long-term goal is not yet known, but they can inform
such choices, as we discuss further in the section below on
risk-cost trade-offs.
Feasibility Thresholds. The second key feature of the results is that
for each long-term goal there is a critical threshold of midcentury
conditions beyond which achieving the 2100 target becomes
infeasible with currently known technological options. This level
is indicated in Fig. 2 by the rapid, nearly vertical rise in costs as
the midcentury emissions level increases, or zero-carbon energy
share decreases. For example, results for the B2 baseline scenario
show that if CO2 emissions in 2050 are above about 10.5 GtC/yr,
or zero-carbon energy shares are below about 50%, achieving the
550 ppm CO2-eq. goal in 2100 becomes infeasible. Higher long-
term targets become infeasible at successively higher midcentury
emissions levels (or successively lower zero-carbon energy shares).
Fig. 2 also indicates that the lower the long-termgoal, the closer the
feasibility threshold becomes to the optimal midcentury condi-
tions. This outcome reflects the fact that for the most stringent
goals, there are fewer choices for how to achieve them.
Infeasibility occurs because, given the atmospheric concentra-
tions already reached in 2050, the state of the energy system at
that time, and the energy demand to be met over the second half
of the century, the model is unable to supply enough energy from
known sources at a low enough carbon intensity to achieve the
2100 goal. The midcentury emissions level at which the feasibility
threshold occurs is influenced by assumptions about resource
availability and the rate at which low- or zero-carbon technologies
can penetrate the market to meet demand, as well as by the
assumed reference scenario.
The feasibility thresholds can be compared to results published
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
The IPCC assessment relates long-term concentration targets
to emissions at midcentury based on a summary of the mitigation
scenario literature (20). Fig. 3 shows the range of midcentury
emissions that occur in scenarios with different long-term concen-
tration targets. Similar to our analysis, the IPCC scenario set in-
Fig. 2. Relationship between midcentury conditions and total energy system costs for a range of long-term CO2-eq concentration targets, assuming the B2
(Left) or A2r (Right) reference scenarios. Upper panels showmidcentury conditions for CO2 emissions, Lower panels for share of zero-carbon sources in primary
energy. Colored lines depict the relationship for each long-term CO2-eq. concentration target, with the horizontal bars indicating the corresponding
cost-optimal midcentury condition. The u-shape of the curves reflects rising costs if either too little or too much mitigation is undertaken by 2050, relative
to the optimum. Costs are higher in the A2r scenario due to higher energy demand and slower rates of technological change relative to B2. The nearly vertical
rise in costs indicate the location of the feasibility frontier; emissions higher than this level in 2050 make the long-term goal infeasible.
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cludes stabilization as well as overshoot scenarios aimed at stay-
ing at or below the long-term target by 2100. However these sce-
narios are not based on any explicit consideration of feasibility;
rather, they typically represent least-cost pathways to known
long-term goals, as calculated by different models. Our feasibility
thresholds lie at or above the upper end of the IPCC ranges. This
result suggests that, under some conditions, it may be possible to
achieve the long-term concentration outcomes with emissions
that are considerably higher than indicated in the IPCC table.
For example, the IPCC range indicates that stabilization at
490–535 ppm (category II) is consistent with 2050 emissions that
are 30–60% below 2000 levels, whereas we find that in the B2
scenario, it is feasible, albeit far from cost optimal, to reach
the same stabilization level with midcentury emissions that are
20% above 2000 levels. However, this comparison is sensitive
to scenario assumptions. In the A2r scenario, if midcentury emis-
sions are significantly above the IPCC ranges, the long-term goal
becomes infeasible.
Long-Term Temperature Goals. We next examine the relationship
between midcentury targets and long-term temperature change
outcomes. Fig. 4 summarizes both the least-cost midcentury emis-
sions levels and the feasibility threshold results. Instead of expres-
sing outcomes at the end of the century in terms of equivalent
CO2 concentrations, as in Figs. 2 and 3, we express them as
the likelihood that the full path of radiative forcing experienced
over the century would lead to <3 °C (Left) or <2 °C (Right) of
temperature change in 2100, relative to preindustrial. The figure
shows that, in general, the greater the desired certainty in
achieving the long-term goal, the lower the least-cost emissions
level at midcentury, and also the lower the feasibility threshold.
For example, to have a 50% chance of limiting warming to <2 °C
in 2100, the least-cost emissions level in 2050 would be 5.5–
6.5 GtC/yr, assuming the B2 baseline scenario. However, if emis-
sions were slightly above this range (e.g. 7 GtC/yr by midcentury)
it would be infeasible to limit warming to <2 °C with 50% cer-
tainty. These results can be compared with the EU expectation
(9) that achieving the goal of limiting warming to 2 °C with 50%
likelihood would be consistent with reductions in global emissions
at midcentury of up to 50% below 1990 levels (or about 57% be-
low 2000 levels). The EU figure is substantially more aggressive
than our results for the B2 scenario, which indicate optimal
midcentury reductions of about 22–35%, and an infeasibility
threshold at about 20%, below 2000 levels. However, scenario
assumptions are crucial in this case: In the A2r scenario, achiev-
ing 2 °C with 50% likelihood is only barely feasible under any cir-
cumstances, and then only with reductions of >50% by 2050. The
difficulty in achieving this long-term goal in the A2r scenario is
driven by a combination of high energy demand and slow rates of
technological change.
Results also indicate that for a 3 °C target in 2100, optimal mid-
century conditions and infeasibility thresholds are substantially
relaxed. In general, the 3 °C target remains feasible at a higher
likelihood than 50% for midcentury emissions that are substan-
tially above the 7 GtC that applies to our 2 °C example. For ex-
ample, achieving the 3 °C target with 75% likelihood is feasible
even if emissions in 2050 approach about 10 GtC/yr (in the B2
scenario). Another way to compare results for the two long-term
goals is to compare what the same midcentury conditions imply in
the two cases. For example, the optimal midcentury conditions
and feasibility thresholds for achieving a 2 °C target with 50%
likelihood are essentially the same as those that would apply
to achieving a 3 °C target with 95% likelihood.
The supporting information provides an overview table with a
cohesive summary of our results, showing the direct conse-
quences of selecting alternative midcentury emissions, zero-
carbon energy, or concentration targets for the feasibility of stay-
ing below long-term temperature and concentration thresholds
(as well as corresponding ranges for the “cost-optimal” long-term
concentration targets). It also indicates that in most cases our fea-
sibility threshold results are conservative with respect to out-
comes beyond 2100. Because in most cases temperatures are
declining in 2100, the likelihood of achieving a target would
typically increase beyond the end of the century. On the other
hand, this also implies that the likelihood of being below the
target before 2100 in these scenarios is lower than the probability
given for the year 2100.
Risk-Cost Trade-Offs. Lower midcentury emissions targets reduce
the risk of crossing an (uncertain) feasibility threshold, which
would make a given long-term target impossible to achieve. How-
ever, this reduced risk comes at some cost, and our results give
some insight into this risk-cost trade-off. For example, Fig. 2
shows the costs over the full 2000–2100 period of achieving a
long-term 550 ppm concentration goal for a variety of midcentury
emissions levels. The long-term goal is infeasible if emissions are
above about 10.5 GtC/yr in 2050. Given that the precise location
of this threshold is uncertain, the risk of inadvertently crossing it
would be reduced if emissions at midcentury were substantially
below 10.5 GtC/yr. The cost results indicate that over the range
of 7–10 GtC/yr, energy system costs as measured over the century
are roughly similar and begin to rise substantially only when emis-
sion are reduced below 7 GtC/yr. These results suggest that in
some cases reducing the infeasibility risk, by reducing emissions
somewhat below the feasibility threshold, can be accomplished at
little or no cost.
More generally, these results can be used to evaluate risk–cost
trade-offs associated with a given midcentury target and a range
of long-term goals that might be under consideration but not yet
decided upon. For example, suppose one wanted to evaluate how
appropriate a 7 GtC/yr emissions target for 2050 might be if long-
term goals were uncertain but might lie between 480 ppm CO2-
eq. (associated in Fig. 4 with about 45% likelihood of staying be-
low 2 °C, and 90% likelihood of staying below 3 °C) and 600 ppm
CO2-eq. (associated with about a 15% likelihood of staying below
2 °C and 60% likelihood of staying below 3 °C). Fig. 2 shows that a
2050 emissions level of about 7 Gtc/yr is just at the edge of feasi-
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bility for achieving a 480 ppm long-term goal. This outcome would
incur energy system costs of about 46.5 trillion US dollars, and
would require the maximum feasible emissions reductions after
2050. If in 2050 it were decided instead that meeting a 550 ppm
long-term goal were sufficient, total costs would decline to about
45 trillion US dollars. This lower cost would be driven primarily by
themuch less stringent reductions required after 2050. Similarly, if
it were decided in 2050 that a long-term outcome of 600 ppm CO2
were acceptable, costs would decline further to about 44.5 trillion
US dollars. In this last case, costs would not be optimal: If it had
been known at the start of the century that the long-term goal were
600 ppm, a higher midcentury target would have produced lower
total costs. However, this would have also sacrificed the possibility
of limiting concentrations to 480 ppm, because a higher midcen-
tury emissions level would have made that outcome infeasible.
Here, these results allow us to evaluate the cost of hedging against
the possibility that achieving a lower long-term concentration goal
may become desirable.
Midcentury targets could also inform an iterative risk manage-
ment strategy on a shorter timescale. Although in our analysis
mitigation strategies are set at only two points in time (now
and in 2050), new scientific, political, or economic information
obtained over the next decade or two could be used to (i) revise
the range of long-term options to be preserved, (ii) revise the
assessment of midcentury goals, and (iii) adjust the initial mitiga-
tion strategy to be consistent with these revised assessments.
Discussion
Our analysis indicates that goals for limiting climate change in the
long-term are associated with midcentury conditions that must be
achieved to prevent long-term objectives from becoming infeasi-
ble. Feasibility thresholds identified here in some cases lie con-
siderably above 2050 emissions targets that are frequently argued
to be necessary to achieve to reach long-term goals. For example,
depending on assumptions about baseline development paths,
thresholds can lie substantially above midcentury emissions levels
identified by the EU as necessary for achieving its 2 °C target, or
by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report as associated with
various long-term concentration stabilization levels.
The difference between our feasibility thresholds and these
commonly cited midcentury targets does not necessarily imply
that they are inconsistent. Our results allow for overshooting
the long-term goal, whereas the EU 2 °C goal does not; the fea-
sibility threshold depends on the desired probability of attaining
the goal one wishes to preserve as well as on the assumed baseline
scenario; and perhaps most importantly, interim targets would
probably best be set below, not at, the estimated feasibility thresh-
old. Nonetheless, our results indicate that current policy goals
should be interpreted as choices involving trade-offs, not neces-
sarily as requirements from the technological point of view.
Our conclusions on feasibility thresholds refer only to techno-
logical feasibility (see SI Text for a discussion of causes of
infeasibility) and should be interpreted in a larger context of
plausibility. On the one hand, the development of new technol-
ogies not considered in our analysis could expand the range of
achievable long-term climate change outcomes. On the other,
consideration of social, political, and institutional constraints
not incorporated here (28) would restrict that range. The quan-
titative results are specific to the modeling framework we use,
Fig. 4. Relationship between midcentury CO2 emissions and the probability of being below a temperature change of 3 °C (Left) or 2 °C (Right) in 2100. Red
area marks division between feasible (to the left) and infeasible (to the right) combinations of 2050 emissions levels and likelihoods of being below
temperature thresholds in 2100. Green area marks ranges of least-cost midcentury conditions for different likelihoods of being below thresholds.Upper panels
show the relationship for the B2 mitigation scenarios based on a single climate sensitivity PDF (26). Lower panels illustrate the baseline uncertainty, comparing
results for the B2 (Shaded) and the A2r scenarios (dashed lines). Note different scales on the axes. Lower emissions levels by 2050 increase the likelihood of
keeping temperature change <2° C or <3° C in 2100. For a given emissions level in 2050, the likelihood of a long-term temperature goal being feasible is
generally lower in the A2r scenarios due to the greater energy demand to be met (Lower).
O’Neill et al. PNAS ∣ January 19, 2010 ∣ vol. 107 ∣ no. 3 ∣ 1015
SU
ST
A
IN
A
BI
LI
TY
SC
IE
N
CE
both to the structure of the model and to assumptions it contains
regarding technology costs and constraints on penetration rates,
as well as to assumptions regarding resource constraints. It
would be valuable for other modeling groups to carry out similar
analyses to test the robustness of the findings.
Inadditionto identifying feasibility thresholds,wefindthat there
are also important economic trade-offs with regards to the balance
of themitigation effort between the first and secondhalf of the cen-
tury. We identify midcentury conditions that would be optimal,
from the point of view of mitigation costs, given that specific
long-term goals were not known until the middle of the century.
More broadly, midcentury conditions can be seen as a way toman-
age jointly the risks and costs of uncertain long-term goals. If the
long-term goal is uncertain, there is a risk that by the time it is
decided upon, potentially desirable options will no longer be fea-
sible (orwillbeprohibitivelyexpensive) toachieve.There isa trade-
off between reducing this risk and the cost of emissionsmitigation,
which can be managed through the use of midcentury targets.
Our analysis suggests that, although we have implemented
midcentury targets in terms of emissions levels in 2050, outcomes
strongly depend on concentrations and zero-carbon energy shares
as well, raising the possibility that targets set in those terms could
also be effective. Several studies have proposed that a policy
approach based on cumulative emissions budgets would be more
robust to scientific uncertainties than targets expressed as emis-
sions levels in a given year (29–31), but these studies focused on
CO2-only and total allowable emissions regardless of timeframe
rather than emissions over the 2000-2050 period. Like our ana-
lysis, Meinshausen et al. (15) consider multigas scenarios and the
midcentury time frame. They conclude that both cumulative
emissions through 2050 and emission levels in 2050 are robust
indicators of the likelihood of achieving a 2 °C warming target.
We did not explicitly assess targets set in terms of cumulative
emissions. However, when our scenario outcomes are expressed
in cumulative terms (see SI Text), they suggest that long-term
climate outcomes strongly depend on cumulative emissions over
the first half of the century as well as on midcentury emissions
levels. Further work on the implications of different metrics
for midcentury targets would thus be useful.
There are several caveats to the results presented here. Results
are influenced by economicparameter choices such as the discount
rate. Although the discount rate does not affect the feasibility
threshold, a lower discount rate will make near-term reductions
less expensive relative to those made in the long-term and will
therefore lower the least-cost midcentury emissions level. Results
are also sensitive to climate systemuncertainties.Weemploy a par-
ticular probability density function for climate sensitivity that is
near the middle of the range in the literature. The identification
of feasibility thresholds and least-cost midcentury conditions is
sensitive to the choice of pdf (see SI Text). In addition, our analysis
allows for temperatures to overshoot the long-term targets before
achieving them in the year 2100. In fact, all B2 scenarios, and some
A2 scenarios, at the feasibility frontier are overshoot scenarios, im-
plyingdeclining temperature changepost-2100.Limiting scenarios
to never exceed the target would likely affect results. Furthermore,
uncertainties regarding the temperature response to rapid emis-
sions reductions (32) could also affect results.
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